Curiosidades afganas

“Si me siguen presionando, juro que me convierto en talibán” (www.cba.ca, 5–4–10). La frase pertenece a Hamid Karzai, impuesto por EE.UU. como primer ministro antes y luego como presidente de un Afganistán en guerra y devastado. Occidente lo presiona para que erradique el cultivo de las amapolas del opio que terminan en heroína, fuente de la corrupción del gobierno y alimento financiero de la guerrilla talibán, presente ya en extensas zonas del territorio del país. Para los ocupantes se trata de un problema militar.

Karzai critica a Obama y fabrica otras curiosidades: acusó a la Casa Blanca de un intento de amaño de las últimas elecciones para impedirle ocupar la presidencia. Amaño hubo, fraude, mejor dicho, pero a favor de Karzai y hasta las Naciones Unidas legitimaron su triunfo. El pretexto del mandatario afgano oculta que no quiere o no puede terminar con el opio y sus consecuencias en el que se ha convertido en el primer narco–Estado del mundo. EE.UU. mucho contribuyó para que así sea.

No había amapolas en Afganistán cuando las tropas soviéticas lo invadieron, en 1979. Los señores de la guerra alentaron su cultivo para conseguir armas, pero se convirtió en un verdadero instrumento político sólo cuando la CIA decidió financiar a los mujaidines por intermedio de los servicios secretos de Pakistán (ISI, por sus siglas en inglés). La CIA realizó operativos de contrabando de heroína y en diez años destinó casi 2 mil millones de dólares a “los combatientes de la libertad” (Ronald Reagan). La guerra antisoviética encubierta del espionaje estadounidense convirtió las zonas fronterizas de Pakistán/Afganistán en las mayores productoras de heroína del planeta.

A medida que los mujaidines ocupaban áreas agrícolas, comenzaron a llevar grandes cantidades de opio a los centenares de laboratorios pakistaníes protegidos por el ISI. La producción opiácea afgana pasó de 250 a 2000 toneladas entre 1981 y 1990; de Pakistán llegaba el 60 por ciento de la heroína consumida en EE.UU. La Casa Blanca detuvo esta actividad de la CIA en 1991, dos años después de que los soviéticos se retiraran de Afganistán. Dejaba atrás un país devastado, una guerra civil, un millón de muertos y cinco millones de refugiados.

Los talibán tomaron el poder en 1996 y promovieron la expansión de los cultivos de amapola, la producción llegó a 4600 toneladas, equivalente al 75 por ciento del consumo mundial, y el régimen impuso un impuesto del 20 por ciento a la cosecha anual. Impulsó además la instalación de centenares de laboratorios de refinación de heroína. Pero en el 2000, el líder talibán Mullah Omar, deseoso de ganar el reconocimiento internacional, cometió un acto de economía suicida: prohibió el cultivo, arrasó con el 94 por ciento de territorio sembrado, redujo la producción de opio a 185 toneladas y dejó sin sustento al 20 por ciento de la población afgana.

Derrotado el talibán, la CIA empleó sus métodos habituales para que los señores de la guerra, siempre activos en el narcotráfico, se apoderaran de ciudades y pueblos en el este de Afganistán, zona lindante con Pakistán. A su juego los llamaron: la producción de opio subió abruptamente a 3400 toneladas sólo en el primer año de la ocupación. Cinco años después, su cultivo abarcaba una superficie superior a la de los cultivos de coca en toda América latina, de acuerdo con un informe de las Naciones Unidas (www.nytimes.com, 28–8–07). Las 185 toneladas de antes de la invasión se fueron a 8200 en el 2007, es decir, un 53 por ciento del PBI nacional y un 93 por ciento del suministro mundial de heroína. Del opio vive al menos un 30 por ciento de la población afgana.

Otra curiosidad: la necesidad de ganarse el apoyo de los habitantes de Marja, verdadera capital mundial de la heroína, ubicada en la provincia de Helmand y recuperada del control talibán, “ha puesto a los comandantes de EE.UU. y la OTAN en la inusual posición de oponerse a la erradicación de los cultivos de opio” (The New York Times, 20–3–10). Los efectivos norteamericanos ya no los arrasan (www.mercurynews.com, 20–3–10) y se entiende: del 60 al 70 por ciento de los campesinos de la zona siembra amapola.

El general McChrystal, comandante en jefe de las tropas ocupantes, visitó un pueblo del lugar acompañado del vicepresidente segundo de Afganistán, Karim Khalili, y presenció la ira de los 200 campesinos cuidadosamente preparados para recibirlos. “Si vienen los tractores (utilizados para erradicar) –les gritó una viuda afgana vitoreada por todos los presentes–, tendrán que pasar encima de mí y matarme antes de matar a mis amapolas” (www.nytimes.com, 1–3–10). El general entendió el mensaje y Karzai se siente sostenido en su voluntad de cambiar nada.

Afghan Leader Is Seen to Flout Influence of U.S.

Kabul, Afghanistan — This month, with President Hamid Karzai looking ahead to a visit to the White House, he received a terse note from aides to President Obama: Your invitation has been revoked.

The reason, according to American officials, was Mr. Karzai’s announcement that he was emasculating an independent panel that had discovered widespread fraud in Mr. Karzai’s re–election last year.

Incensed, Mr. Karzai extended an invitation of his own — to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, who flew to Kabul and delivered a fiery anti–American speech inside Afghanistan’s presidential palace.

“Karzai was enraged,” said an Afghan with knowledge of the events, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the delicacy of the issue. “He invited Ahmadinejad to spite the Americans.”

The dispute was smoothed over only this week, when Mr. Obama flew to Kabul for a surprise dinner with Mr. Karzai. White House officials emphasized that the most important purpose of Mr. Obama’s trip to Afghanistan was to visit American troops there.

But the red carpet treatment of Mr. Ahmadinejad is just one example of how Mr. Karzai is putting distance between himself and his American sponsors, prominent Afghans and American officials here said. Even as Mr. Obama pours tens of thousands of additional American troops into the country to help defend Mr. Karzai’s government, Mr. Karzai now often voices the view that his interests and the United States’ no longer coincide.

Neither Mr. Karzai nor his spokesman, Waheed Omar, could be reached Monday. But according to Afghan associates, Mr. Karzai recently told lunch guests at the presidential palace that he believes the Americans are in Afghanistan because they want to dominate his country and the region, and that they pose an obstacle to striking a peace deal with the Taliban. During the recent American–dominated military offensive in the town of Marja — the largest of the war — Mr. Karzai stood mostly in the shadows.

Indeed, the recent behavior by Mr. Karzai offers the latest illustration of the central dilemma that faces the Obama administration in Afghanistan: how to influence the actions of an ally who they increasingly regard as unreliable, without undermining America’s ultimate goals here.

“We’re trying to find this balance of keeping pressure on him, without setting up bluffs that can be called,” said a senior official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the delicacy of the matter. “We’re coming to terms with dealing with the Karzai we have.”

Perhaps the clearest example of the American dilemma is the graft in Mr. Karzai’s government. American officials have repeatedly pushed Mr. Karzai to clean up his government, as Mr. Obama stressed during his dinner with the Afghan leader. But Mr. Karzai has resisted all but the most feeble gestures.

Some prominent Afghans say that Mr. Karzai now tells associates that the Americans’ goal here is not to build an independent and peaceful Afghanistan, but to exercise their power.

In January, Mr. Karzai invited about two dozen prominent Afghan media and business figures to a lunch at the palace. At the lunch, he expressed a deep cynicism about America’s motives, and of the burden he bears in trying to keep the United States at bay.

“He has developed a complete theory of American power,” said an Afghan who attended the lunch and who spoke on the condition of anonymity for fear of retribution. “He believes that America is trying to dominate the region, and that he is the only one who can stand up to them.”

Mr. Karzai said that, left alone, he could strike a deal with the Taliban, but that the United States refuses to allow him. The American goal, he said, was to keep the Afghan conflict going, and thereby allow American troops to stay in the country.

The description of the lunch was largely affirmed by two other Afghans who attended and who also declined to be identified. The person who described the meeting said some of the participants urged Mr. Karzai to reconsider his views and his plans to be more assertive with the United States. “We are a poor country,” he said. “We are depending on the United States.”

Mr. Karzai’s ultimate motives are not always clear. It may be that while Mr. Karzai supports the Americans presence here, he believes that distancing himself from the United States plays well among average Afghans.

Though Mr. Karzai won another five–year term last August, he emerged as a badly bruised leader. Amid widespread allegations of fraud, the Election Complaint Commission nullified nearly a million votes counted in his favor. He won after his nearest opponent dropped out of the race.

For their part, officials in the Obama administration have tried to work with Mr. Karzai even as they have seethed over his failure to crack down on corruption. Plans for him to visit Washington were well under way in February, two officials said, when Mr. Karzai issued an order allowing him to handpick all five members of the election panel, which uncovered so much fraud in his re–election.

The move would have deprived the United Nations of any oversight over future Afghan elections. The Obama administration, which had floated several dates for a Karzai visit but not decided on one, decided to delay it, several officials said.

“We wanted to have a great visit,” one official said. “But in order to have a great visit, we needed to see four or five things happen.”

Last week, under Western pressure, Mr. Karzai backpedaled slightly and agreed to appoint two non–Afghan members to the election commission. Still, Mr. Karzai is reserving the right to appoint the foreigners himself; before, that authority rested with the United Nations. And Mr. Karzai did not restore the spaces once reserved for two other independent members.

Iran is a neighbor of Afghanistan, and American officials say they do not object to the two countries discussing issues of mutual interest. “He can be close to us, have a cooperative bilateral relationship with us, and a good working relationship with his neighborhood,” a senior American official said.

But the recent visit by Mr. Ahmadinejad seemed designed to generate as much attention as possible — including in Washington. With Mr. Karzai standing at his side in Kabul, Mr. Ahmadinejad accused the United States of promoting terrorism.

(*) Dexter Filkins reported from Kabul, Afghanistan, and Mark Landler from Washington.